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Regulation 1210/90: Establishment of the 
European Environment Agency 
INTRODUCTION 
Last May, after seventeen years of increasing worldwide con-
cern for the environment, the European Community (EC or 
Community) passed Regulation 1210/90 establishing the Euro-
pean Environment Agency (EEA or Agency).' The EEA's pri-
mary function is to act as a coordination and dissemination center 
for environmental information in the Community.2 Many see 
establishment of the EEA as a positive step towards uniform 
control over the environment by the Community as well as non-
member nations. 3 Critics, however, have stressed the Agency's 
limitations, especially its lack of enforcement powers. 4 
This Note presents a critical evaluation of the EEA. Part I 
discusses Community environmental policies in the years preced-
ing establishment of the EEA, including the various EC action 
programs on the environment.5 Part II addresses the regulation 
establishing the EEA. Part III then examines the defects of the 
EEA in light of current environmental regulation in the Com-
munity. This Note concludes that the EEA could playa more 
meaningful role if it were to have inspection and interpretation 
powers. Such powers would give the EEA consistently reliable 
data, and would eliminate costly and time-consuming litigation 
over member state compliance with environmental directives. 
1. COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
Increasing Community concern for environmental protection 
during the 1970's resulted in four action programs on the envi-
I Regulation 1210/90, Council Regulation of 7 May 1990 on the establishment of the 
European Environment Agency and the European environment information and obser-
vation network, OJ. L1201l (1990) [hereinafter Regulation 1210/90]. 
2 [d. at 2. 
3 Fin. Times, June 18, 1990, at 4, col. 2. 
4 See European Environment Agency-State of the environment and natural resources 
in the Community, OJ. 3-386174, at 75 (1990) [hereinafter Parliamentary Debates]. 
5 See infra notes 6, 12, 15, and 21 and accompanying text. 
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ronment. Each of these action programs concentrated on a spe-
cific area of environmental policy, but incorporated the goals of 
preceding programs. 
The EC adopted its first action program (First Environmental 
Action Program) in December, 1973.6 The legal basis of the First 
Environmental Action Program was article 2 of the EEC Treaty,' 
which called on member states to reconcile economic develop-
ment and expansion with a higher standard of living.8 Recogniz-
ing environmental degradation as the usual price of expansion, 
Title I of the First Environmental Action Program required that 
economic expansion be balanced with environmental preserva-
tion.9 The First Environmental Action Program stressed uniform 
measurement of environmental information JO but only suggested 
broad plans of action, rather than specific processes. I I 
The second action program (Second Environmental Action 
Program) highlighted the importance of individual member state 
compliance procedures. 12 The Second Environmental Action Pro-
gram sought to encourage compliance by establishing a decen-
tralized information system that would enable member states to 
access a range of data sources to obtain the necessary inform a-
6 Declaration of the Council of the European Communities and of the Representatives 
of the Governments of the Member States meeting in the Council, of 22 November 1973, 
on the programme of action of the European Communities on the environment, O.J. 
C1l2/1 (1973) [hereinafter First Environmental Action Program]. 
7 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,1957,298 U.N.T.S. 
11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. 
8 [d. at art. 2. 
9 First Environmental Action Program, supra note 6, at 5. 
10 [d. at S. In addition to the pragmatic balancing of expansion and environmental 
concerns, the Council was also concerned that the member states coordinate their envi-
ronmental policies to harmonize them with those of the Community. 
11 [d. Subsequently, the EC acknowledged the need to manage environmental data in 
December, 1975. Decision 76/161, Council Decision of S December 1975 establishing a 
common procedure for the setting up and constant updating of an inventory of sources 
of information on the environment in the Community, 0.]. L311S (1975). The inventory 
procedure established a common procedure for inventorying sources of environmental 
information in the Community. The inventory procedure called on member states to 
provide lists of scientific and technical information and documentation centers and ser· 
vices such as laboratories and government agencies; specialist centers and independent 
experts; and current or scheduled research projects. Upon receipt of this information, 
the Commission would be required to develop a procedure to classify and manage the 
data. 
12 Resolution of the Council of the European Communities and of the Representatives 
of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, of 17 May 1977, 
on the continuation and implementation of a European Community policy and action 
programme on the environment, O.J. C139/1 (1977). 
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tion. i3 Encouraged by member state efforts to set up organiza-
tions that would provide scientific, technical, and economic data, 14 
the Council also introduced the possibility of a permanent EC 
program of regular statistics on the environment. Recognizing 
that the Community's expansion and harmonization efforts 
would be ineffective without a campaign to reduce pollution and 
improve environmental protection, the Council of the European 
Communities (Council) extended the Second Environmental Ac-
tion Program through 1981. 
The Council incorporated concern for divergent member state 
interpretation of EC environmental policies into its third action 
program (Third Environmental Action Program).i5 The Third 
Environmental Action Program provided for the monitoring of 
member state compliance with EC directives in order to 
strengthen the cohesion of Community and member state envi-
ronmental policy.i6 The Third Environmental Action Program 
marked a change in the EC's position on environmental policy 
by stressing that social developments and improved living con-
ditions were just as important as the economic benefits of a co-
ordinated environmental policyY 
Two years after adoption of the Third Environmental Action 
Program, the Council established an experimental project for 
gathering, coordinating, and managing environmental informa-
tion. is This program, the Coordinated Information on the En-
IS Jd. at 39. 
11 Jd. at 38. 
15 Resolution of the Council of the European Communities and of the Representatives 
of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council of 7 February 1983 
on the continuation of a European Community policy and action programme on the 
environment (1982 to 1986), OJ. C461l (1983). 
16 Id. at 6. 
17 Id. at 3. 
18 Decision 85/338, Council Decision of 27 June 1985 on the adoption of the Commis-
sion work programme concerning an experimental project for gathering, coordinating, 
and ensuring the consistency of information on the state of the environment and natural 
resources in the Community, OJ. Ll761l4 (1985) [hereinafter CORINE]. 
The Council later extended CORINE for a two-year transitional period, after which 
the EEA will take over the CORINE work as part of its regular functions. Decision 90/ 
150, OJ. L811~~8 (1990). 
Prior to the extension of CORINE, the Council passed another directive on the varying 
levels of environmental protection in the member states. Directive 85/337, Council Direc-
tive of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects 
on the environment, OJ. L175/40 (1985) [hereinafter Assessment Directive]. The Assess-
ment Directive focused on disparate member state laws on the assessment of environ-
mental risks in construction projects. Disparate laws create unfavorable competitive con-
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vironment Program (CORINE), was established to fulfill the third 
action program's goals of obtaining consistent and comparative 
information on the state of the environment and natural re-
sources. CORINE called for the gradual establishment of a system 
for gathering information on the environment over the period 
from 1985 to 1988. 19 The Council also recognized the economic 
value of such a system. A coordinated approach would be less 
expensive than an ad hoc approach to the environmental prob-
lems of the member states, and thus would be more likely to 
foster long-term economic growth. 20 
The Community's fourth action program (Fourth Environmen-
tal Action Program),2I now in effect, was established under the 
Single European Act (SEA).22 The Fourth Environmental Action 
Program differs from its predecessors in that it more clearly 
recognizes specific environmental priorities.23 Specifically, the 
Fourth Environmental Action Program identifies the need for 
better research on the environment, better environmental impact 
ditions that adversely affect the Community's functioning. The Directive called on mem-
ber states to make environmental assessments of public and private projects, and to share 
that information with the EC. [d. at 41, 43. The directive contained an "escape clause" 
that allowed a member state to exempt a construction project based on its investment or 
commitment. [d. at 41. 
19 [d. at 16 . 
• 0 Proposal for a Council Decision on the adoption of a work programme for the first 
phase of implementation of an information system on the state of the environment and 
the natural resources in the Community (1984 to 1987),0.]. C29118 (1983) [hereinafter 
CORINE Proposal]. 
'1 Resolution of the Council of the European Communities and of the Representatives 
of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council of 19 October 1987 
on the continuation and implementation of a European Community policy and action 
programme on the environment (1987 to 1992),0.]. C328/1 (1987) [hereinafter Fourth 
Environmental Action Program] . 
•• Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986,0.]. Ll69/1 (1987) [hereinafter SEA]. Articles 
100A and 130r of the EEC Treaty require a high level of environmental protection in 
Commission proposals, as well as Community action on environmental issues where such 
action would be more effective than at the member state level. Prior to the SEA, there 
were no explicit provisions for environmental protection in the EEC Treaty. The Com-
munity had relied on two provisions of the EEC Treaty to justify environmental programs 
and directives. EEC Treaty, supra note 7, at arts. 100, 235. Article 235 states that "if action 
by the Commission should prove necessary to attain . . . one of the objectives of the 
Community, and [the] Treaty has not provided for the necessary powers, the Council 
shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, and after consulting the 
[Parliament], take the appropriate measures." [d. at art. 235. The SEA, however, provided 
a specific legal basis for a Commission program on the environment. 
.s Fourth Environmental Action Program, supra note 21, at 2. 
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assessments, wider access to environmental information, and in-
creased efforts regarding public education on the environment.24 
The Fourth Environmental Action Program recognizes that 
national environmental protection measures can function as im-
pediments to free trade, and that member state reports on com-
pliance with EC environmental directives are often erratic. 25 The 
program also recommended continuation of CORINE to ensure 
that comparative environmental data is provided to interested 
parties.26 The clear articulation of Community environmental 
priorities in the Fourth Environmental Action Program laid the 
groundwork for the EEA. 
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EEA 
The Council passed Regulation 1210/90 establishing the EEA 
based on the combined experience of the four action programs 
on the environment and in accordance with its treaty authority 
under the SEA.27 As with previous environmental initiatives, the 
objective of the EEA is to provide member states with objective, 
reliable, and comparative environmental information. This infor-
mation should then enable the member states to take the neces-
sary measures to protect the environment, to evaluate the results, 
and to ensure that the public is properly informed about the state 
of the environment.28 
Regulation 1210/90 authorizes the EEA to: (1) collect, process, 
and analyze environmental data; (2) provide the Community with 
information that it needs to successfully carry out its tasks of 
identifying, preparing, and evaluating measures and legislation 
concerning the environment; (3) provide uniform assessment cri-
teria for environmental data applicable to all member states; and 
(4) encourage improved harmonization of environmental mea-
surement methods.29 
24 [d. at 6, 9. 
'5 [d. at 9. The Fourth Environmental Action Program also raised for the first time the 
question of whether the Community should have environmental inspectors appointed to 
work with national officials to ensure harmonious and effective implementation of EC 
law . 
• 6 [d. at 16 . 
• 7 See generally Regulation 1210/90, supra note l. 
.8 Regulation 1210/90, supra note 1, at 2 . 
• 9 [d. Other objectives of the EEA include promoting integration of EC environmental 
data by means of international compilations; ensuring the broad dissemination of reliable 
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Member states will play a central role in EEA activities. Indi-
vidual member state environmental agencies will function as the 
Agency's basic information sources. Under article 4 of the regu-
lation, each state must inform the EEA of the main elements of 
its domestic environmental network. The member states may 
decide which of these environmental organizations will work di-
rectly with the Agency.30 The states may also declare certain 
organizations to be "topic centres" that will deal with specific 
environmental issues. 
The Agency's management board consists of one representative 
from each member state and two representatives from the Com-
mission. In addition, the European Parliament may select two 
scientific personnel to sit on the board. The board is governed 
by a chairman it elects to a three-year term, and decisions of the 
board require a two-thirds majority. While membership on the 
board is limited to the parties mentioned in the regulation, par-
ticipation in the EEA is open to member states as well as non-
member nations.31 At present, the regulation does not specify 
how non-member nations will participate. Nevertheless, several 
Eastern European nations have expressed interest.32 The EEA 
will commence operations once the Commission has selected a 
location for it.33 
During debates in the European Parliament, several members 
expressed dissatisfaction with the EEA's proposed role, noting 
that its lack of powers prevent it from addressing the problem of 
partial or non-compliance with EC environmental directives.34 
information; promoting the development of environmental forecasting techniques; pro-
moting the development of methods of assessing the costs of damage to the environment; 
promoting the exchange of information on the best ways available to avoid harm to the 
environment; and cooperation with other governmental and non-governmental bodies. 
30 [d. at 3. 
31 [d. at 5. Information collected by the EEA is available to non-member states and 
private individuals, subject to Commission and member state rules on confidentiality. [d. 
at 3. 
32 Fin. Times, June 18, 1990, at 4, col. 2. Among the Eastern European nations that 
have expressed interest are the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. 
33 Regulation 1210/90, supra note 1, at 5. Two leading candidates for the site are 
Madrid and Copenhagen, though officially all member states may propose cities in their 
countries. EEC's Delors Compares Seat Wrangle to Marx Brothers Film, Reuter Library Report, 
Oct. 23, 1990 (NEXIS, EUROPE file). Recently, however, France has said that it will biock 
the decision on the EEA location until the Community confirms Strasbourg as the per-
manent home of the European Parliament. 
34 See Parliamentary Debates, supra note 4, at 74. Beate Weber, rapporteur for the 
committee on the proposal for the EEA, pointed out the "dissatisfaction [which] is also 
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Despite the 362 infringements ofEC environmental law in 1989,35 
the EEA remains limited to an advisory and collection role.36 In 
effect, then, the EEA is a more formal version of CORINE.37 
Carlo Ripa di Meana, the Community's Commissioner for the 
Environment, views the EEA as a coordinating body, rather than 
an active enforcement body.38 He has also noted a legal limit to 
the delegation of powers. Under the EEC Treaty, the Council 
can transfer powers only to the Commission,39 and cannot dele-
gate its powers to an external independent body.40 The regula-
tion, however, does provide for possible future expansion of the 
Agency's mandate. Additional responsibilities are to be deter-
mined no later than two years after the regulation enters into 
force.4! Pragmatic limits aside,42 the two-year period holds prom-
ise for those who see the EEA as an effective administrative 
authority rather than an "ecological charade."43 
III. A MORE MEANINGFUL ROLE FOR THE EEA 
Certain Community procedures, such as the the protracted and 
burdensome process of taking a member state before the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities (Court of Justice) for 
failure to comply with an environmental directive, suggest that 
the EEA will need expanded powers if it is to be a truly effective 
regulatory body. This section addresses the need for an admin-
istrative body to coordinate member state interpretation of EC 
environmental directives. Such a modification would remedy the 
dangerous inefficiency of litigating environmental disputes in the 
Court of Justice . 
. . . reflected in the fact that the member states are still not prepared really to implement 
Community environment legislation on a sustained basis." This has an extended effect, 
because citizens of member states tend to mistrust governments taken before the European 
Court . 
.. [d. at 74. 
36 [d. at 88. 
37 [d. at 91. 
38 [d. at 115. The EC Environmental Commissioner, Carlo Ripa di Meana, responded 
to the European Parliament's desire for greater powers for the EEA by describing the 
Agency as a "supporting instrument for international environmental policy." 
39 EEC Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 145. 
40 Parliamentary Debates, supra note 4, at 113. 
41 Regulation 1210/90, supra note 1, at 5, art. 20. 
42 Commissioner Ripa di Meana revealed that he refused to allow greater powers to 
the EEA in efforts to retain the consensus over the body's role in the Council of Ministers. 
Fin. Times, Mar. 16, 1990, at 111-3, col. 8. 
43 Parliamentary Debates, supra note 4, at 112. 
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A. Monitoring Powers 
One of the major shortcomings of the EEA is its lack of mon-
itoring powers. Although the Agency will review environmental 
information submitted by member states,44 coordination between 
the states and the EEA is loose. Ideally, the EEA would be able 
to inspect member state compliance with environmental directives 
and compile its own data. Under the current organization, the 
EEA has no control over interpretation of directives by the mem-
ber states.45 The effectiveness of the EEA is thus wholly depen-
dent upon member state reporting habits.46 
When the Community adopts a directive containing a broad 
objective without specific instructions, good-faith interpretations 
by the member states can vary widely. For example, in applying 
the Community's directive on water purity designations, a Ger-
man environmental agency read the directive as protecting only 
freshwater fish and shellfish. Conversely, the Dutch interpreted 
the directive as broadly applying to all watersY 
The Commission's 1986 report on the state of the environment 
in the Community also resulted in divergent member state inter-
pretations.48 The report used general classifications to compile 
data on member state land use, but member states interpreted 
the terms in varying ways. One result of this was the seemingly 
harmless misclassification of national park areas by the member 
states.49 This confusion, however, subverted the Community's 
goal of protecting wildlife in particular areas. 
These problems could be avoided if the EEA were able to 
aggressively monitor member state environmental activities and 
reporting methods, including compliance with directives. With 
monitoring powers, the EEA could step in upon learning that a 
44 Regulation 1210/90, supra note 1, at 2, art. 2(ii). 
45 Regulation 1210/90 does not empower the EEA to verify the accuracy of information 
supplied to it by member states. Under article 7, however, the EEA has legal personality, 
and it may have the ability to bring suit against a member state as though it were a private 
individual. Id. at 3, art. 7. 
46 See Haigh, Analysis and Perspective: The Environmental Policy of the European Community 
and 1992,12 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 617, 619-20 (Dec. 13, 1989). 
47 See Haigh, Assessing EC Environmental Policy; Unweaving the Spider'S Web, 1 EUR. ENV'T 
REP. 38, 39 (Feb. 1987). 
48 Nowicki & Nowicki-Caupin, The State of the Environment in the European Community, 1 
EUR. ENV'T REP. 42, 43 (Sept. 1987), reviewing Commission of the European Communities, 
Directorate-General for Environment, Consumer Protection, and Nuclear Safety, The State 
of the Environment in the European Community 1986. 
49 Id. at 42-43. 
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member state has misapplied or is misinterpreting a directive. It 
could thus act before the problem causes any serious damage to 
the environment or distorts the EEA's compilation of environ-
mental data. 
B. Enforcement Powers 
Currently, the only manner in which the Community can en-
force compliance with environmental directives is to take offend-
ing member states before the Court of Justice.50 These enforce-
ment cases generally take the form of actions by the Commission 
against a member state for failing to live up to its obligations 
under the EEC Treaty.51 When the Commission determines that 
a violation has been committed, it will notify the member state 
by letter.52 If the member state does not answer to its satisfaction, 
the Commission prepares a "reasoned opinion" outlining reme-
dial actions that the member state should take. If the state still 
refuses to comply, the Commission will bring infringement pro-
ceedings before the Court of Justice. 
The Commission has brought legal proceedings against all 
member states in efforts to force compliance with EC environ-
mental directives. 53 Though no member state has ever refused to 
accept the Court of Justice's ruling, state efforts at corrective 
action have varied widely. 54 These disparities in interpretation 
and the delays in bringing the case before the court usually mean 
that the noncomplying activity continues to threaten the environ-
ment, public safety, and Community trade.55 
Varying interpretations of environmental directives by member 
states have been the source of several cases before the court. In 
Re: Groundwater Directive: E.C. Commission v. Netherlands,56 the di-
50 See Sands, European Community Environmental Law: Legislation, the European Court of 
Justice and Common-Interest Groups, 53 MOD. L. REV. 113 (1990), for a discussion of the 
various forms in which environmental cases can reach the Court of Justice. 
5! See, e.g., Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, [1988] E.C.R. 4607, 4609, 54 
C.M.L.R. 619, 623 (1988); Case 291184, Commission v. The Netherlands, [1987] E.C.R. 
3483, 3483, 54 C.M.L.R. 479, 480 (1987). 
52 Haigh, supra note 46, at 619. 
53 European Environment Agency, 13 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 320 (Aug. 8, 1990). 
54 See Haigh, supra note 46, at 619. 
55 See Parliament Plans to Establish Committee to Study Compliance with Environmental Laws, 
13 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 320 (Aug. 8, 1990) [hereinafter Parliament Plans Committee]. 
56 Case 291184, Commission v. The Netherlands, [1987] E.C.R. 3483, 54 C.M.L.R. 479 
(1987). 
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rective at issue concerned the quality of groundwater. Because of 
internal problems with its legislative processes, the Netherlands 
had enacted temporary provisions in partial compliance with the 
directive, assuming this to be satisfactory. The Court of Justice, 
however, reiterated its position that internal member state legal 
problems cannot justify a failure to comply with obligations in 
Commission directives. 57 Another example of opposing interpre-
tations of Community directives is that of The State (Italy) v. Gia-
como Caldana,58 where the Commission and a member state disa-
greed with an individual on the definitions of hazardous 
substances, hazardous wastes, and preparations containing haz-
ardous substances.59 
Other cases have involved a member state whose interpretation 
of an EC environmental directive was correct but too restrictive, 
causing a disruption in trade. In Re: Disposable Beer Cans: E.C. 
Commission v. Denmark, the issue was Denmark's implementation 
of a mandatory bottle recycling directive.6o Denmark adopted a 
program that imposed more stringent measures than those in the 
directive, but posed a significant impairment to internal trade. 
The Court of Justice reasoned that reuse of bottles should be 
encouraged and that member states may impose stricter environ-
mental measures than the Community.6l Nevertheless, the court 
held that these measures favored environmental protection at the 
expense of the internal market and in violation of the EEC Treaty 
right of free movement of goods.62 An EEA with enforcement 
powers could prevent costly, protracted litigation before the 
Court of Justice. When the member state's activities have an 
environmentally harmful impact, such as the confusion over 
marking of hazardous materials in Caldana,63 current enforce-
ment procedures hamper quick discovery and remedy. If the EEA 
had inspection and enforcement powers as urged by the Euro-
57 Id., quoting Cases 30-34/81, Commission v. Italian Republic, [1980] E.C.R. 3379, 
3384 (1980). 
58 Case 187/84, Italy v. Caldana, [1985] E.C.R. 3013, 54 C.M.L.R. 137 (1985). 
59 Id. at 3021, I C.M.L.R. at 145. 
60 Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, [1988] E.C.R. 4607, 4621, 54 C.M.L.R. 619, 
624 (1988). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. The Court of Justice also found, however, that the directive laid down neither 
particular levels of environmental protection nor specific methods to adopt, which caused 
Denmark to rely on its own interpretation of the directive. 
63 See Case 187/84, Italy v. Caldana, [1985] E.C.R. 3013, 3013, 54 C.M.L.R. 137, 137 
(1985). 
1991] EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY 331 
pean Parliament,64 it could obtain independent and reliable evi-
dence of member state infringements and could intervene to halt 
the infringements. 
CONCLUSION 
An agency that can collect and disseminate environmental in-
formation to interested parties will make global ecological man-
agement easier and more effective. Nevertheless, the EEA's cur-
rent mandate does not go far enough. The EEA must have the 
power to ensure the reliability of the information it receives. With 
monitoring powers, the EEA could act to correct a member state's 
misapplication of a directive before the problem causes further 
harm to the environment. The EEA must also have the power to 
force member state compliance with environmental directives. 
Such powers would promote standardized application of EC en-
vironmental directives, and could obviate burdensome litigation 
before the Court of Justice. 
Gerard V. Curtin, Jr. 
64 See generally Parliamentary Debates, supra note 4. 
